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Abstract: 
  
The analysis of influence of institutional factors on development of technologies is carried 
out. The generating role of institutions in technological progress is proved. The general 
logic of an institutionalization of new technological way is presented on an example of 
nanotechnologies. 
 
Institutes are the “weak link” of the concepts and theories of the evolution of technology 
and technological structures. Most modern theorists of evolutionary economics are focused 
mainly on the study of the dynamics and forms of scientific and technological progress, 
especially the mechanisms of nucleation and diffusion of large “clusters” of innovation. 
 
 In their turn, the institutional economists have concentrated on the analysis of factors and 
ways to minimize the transaction costs sustained interaction of agents and their 
organizations “in the high-tech world with a huge degree of specialization and division of 
labor other than impersonal exchange” (North 1997).  
 
In their works only relate to the institutional structure and infrastructure of innovative 
development, although, as noted by Nelson (2002), the concept of national and regional 
innovation systems is institutional in nature   just on this fact is rarely emphasizes the 
attention of scientists. As a result, institutional forms and mechanisms of technological 
evolution is very poorly understood, and their analysis is based on very general ideas about 
the institutes and institutions. 
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Introduction  
 
Institutes are the “weak link” of the concepts and theories of the evolution of 
technology and technological structures. Most modern theorists of evolutionary 
economics are focused mainly on the study of the dynamics and forms of scientific 
and technological progress, especially the mechanisms of nucleation and diffusion 
of large “clusters” of innovation. In their turn, the institutional economists have 
concentrated on the analysis of factors and ways to minimize the transaction costs 
sustained interaction of agents and their organizations “in the high-tech world with 
a huge degree of specialization and division of labor other than impersonal 
exchange” (North, 1997).  
 
While various concepts of technological evolution are partly considered the impact 
of institutional conditions and factors, this aspect of the research is developed 
mainly as a residual principle. Therefore Dementyev (2009) in his review of the 
institutional circumstances of the long-wave dynamics was forced to appeal only to 
the concepts of Glazyev and Perez, (2008).  Leading representatives of the 
evolutionary theory of technological development. In their works only relate to the 
institutional structure and infrastructure of innovative development, although, as 
noted by Nelson (2002), the concept of national and regional innovation systems is 
institutional in nature   just on this fact is rarely emphasizes the attention of 
scientists. As a result, institutional forms and mechanisms of technological 
evolution is very poorly understood, and their analysis is based on very general 
ideas about the institutes and institutions. 
 
Literature Review 
 
According to the approach of Glazyev (2008) “the substitution of technological 
structures requires as a rule corresponding changes in social and institutional 
systems that not only remove the social tension, but also contribute to the mass 
introduction of technologies of the new technological order, its corresponding type 
of consumption and lifestyle”. The institutional structure of technological 
structures, according to the scientist’s opinion includes national and international 
modes of economic regulation, the basic economic institutions and institutional 
processes, as well as ways of organizing innovation activities, but their special 
analysis is not carried out.  
 
According to the concept of innovative paradigms of Hirooka (2006) the diffusion 
of new technologies, initiating output of the economy on the path of development 
and expansion of markets, is accompanied by “specific institutional changes which, 
of course, are important, but not fundamental. Institutions only form a framework 
that supports or hinders the expansion of the main innovations (Hirooka 2004). 
Polterovich (2009) draws attention on the role of the institutional effect of path 
dependence in technology driven global crisis accentuating along with “innovation 
pause” the value of the current evolutionary “reckless belief in continuous 
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technological progress, supported by a long preceding period of rapid development 
and exchange mechanisms”.  
 
Influence of institutions is considered by the concept of techno-economic 
paradigms, developed by Perez (2009) through the enhanced technological systems 
of Freeman’s concepts (1992) and the technical paradigm developed by Dosi 
(1982). The author proceeds from the thesis that “every new technological system 
modifies not only the business environment but also the institutional context, and 
even culture” (Perez, 2009) creating powerful externalities and resonance effects to 
the environment. The “long-term fluctuations, which we call the long waves are the 
result of successive clutches and breaks of two system fields: techno-economic on 
one hand, and social-institutional on the other” (Perez 2004). Thus, institutional 
factors are derived overseas of the economic system and rely exogenous variables 
of its evolution, and social-institutional system seems like a system “of 
environmental type.” 
 
Revealing the nature of technological revolutions, Perez (2009) introduces the 
concept of the institutional reshuffle or institutional re-composition as a necessary 
phase of the implementation of synergies from the interaction of production and 
financial capital, coming after the collapse of the financial “bubble”. At the same 
time, “the main task of the institutional re-composition is to create conditions for 
the expansion of markets and establishing control over productive capital. The 
duration of the recession will depend on the ability of society and the authorities to 
establish direction and institutional changes to restore confidence and the shift in 
emphasis on the creation of real wealth (Perez 2002).  
 
It is noted that in comparison with the techno-economic sphere, the social-
institutional sphere is more resistant to change, and slowly adapt to the changing 
conditions by the institutional inertia (Perez 2002). The depletion of old and the 
formation of a new techno-economic paradigm under the influence of economic 
and social incentives to the progressive changes leads to the development and 
diffusion of the new ideology, which initiates social and political processes of 
reconstructing the institutional structure. This process is chaotic with hardly 
predictable results. 
 
Substantially developing the ideas of Perez and Sergienko (2009) proves that the 
evolution of techno-economic paradigm is accompanied by the change in the 
relation of formal and informal institutions. In the phase of nucleation of a new 
wave of technological innovators experience an acute shortage of financial 
resources, which motivates them to cooperate and to create informal institutions. 
Depletion of the potential of old technologies creates incentives for the expansion 
of bank lending to innovators and innovations in the financial system, but “due to 
the spread of financial and institutional innovations, investment opportunities 
innovators cumulatively expanding” (Sergienko 2010). Then the “innovators are 
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tear the established informal ties and begin fierce competition” in the new 
institutional environment (Sergienko 2010). 
 
In general, it must be noted that the heuristic potential of institutional theory in the 
analysis of the global evolution of the technology is involved underserved. 
Especially strange that after the classic works of North (1994), aimed at creating a 
general theory of technological and institutional changes, there is a pronounced 
loop evolutionary economist on technology as the main factor of growth, although 
this approach is neo-classical in nature and goes back to the works of Solow 
(1950). Technological determinism is not only a major methodological obstacle to 
improvement and enrichment of the institutional and evolutionary economics, but 
also complicates an already extremely complex analysis of the development and 
competitiveness of general purpose technologies. 
 
Therefore, careful attention should be given to the position of Nelson (2008) about 
the need to integrate institutional and technological determinism in the theory of 
economic growth. He offers two-class technology to differentiate, “resuscitating” 
the classification of North and Wallace (1994). This point of view in his later work 
supported by Eggertsson, 2009). 
 
Physical technologies include technology in the tradition understanding that is the 
ways and means of production of material goods. Social technologies by Nelson 
(2000) cover all major forms of economic institutions4 common “rules of the game” 
(North, 2008), “management methods” (Williamson, 2004), as well as a collective 
choice and action procedures (Buchanan, 2005; Nelson, 2002) which ensure the 
reduction of transaction costs in the economy (according to the normative version 
of the “Coase Theorem). The apparent advantage of this classification is the 
possibility of expanding the purely technological concepts of economic evolution 
by their additions institutions in an equal epistemological status with the 
technology.  
 
The downside can be considered a metaphor of the concept of “physical” 
technology, shielding their chemical, biological and converged species groups. In 
addition, reduction of institutions to social technologies distort their actual content, 
that recognizes Nelson (2008) itself, separating finally the concept of “social 
evolution of technology and institutions that support them is a much more 
complicated and uncertain process than the evolution of the physical technologies. 
The stranger is that evolutionists ignore the tremendous role of management, 
                                                          
4 We continue to insist on the need of the categorical differentiation of institutes and of 
institutions (Inshakov and Frolov, 2010; Inshakova, 2010; Frolov 2008). Institutions are 
separate kinds of activities, which are status functions of their agents. Institutes are 
interrelated complexes of institutions and organizations, concomitant their regulations and 
procedures that form the regulatory mechanisms of the transaction (for more details see: 
Frolov and Inyutina 2010). 
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marketing, brokering and financial technology in the progress of the market 
economy. These waves have clearly different dimension than the wave of 
traditional technologies and require special studies. 
 
Through the idea of  “compromise Nelson” the principle of co-evolution of 
“natural” and social technologies (Nelson, 2008) in fact implies conventional 
preserving of the dominant status of technological determinism in the theory of 
evolution in its substantive institutional expansion. But the technology in a general 
sense are interrelated ways to use the methods and tools to improve the efficiency 
of certain activities, from the nature of which should come their classification. 
Therefore, it is methodologically more correct is the delineation of transformation 
(Tf) and transaction (Ta) technology based on the theory meta-production function 
(Inshakov 2007). 
 
The first (Tf) are related to different types of reform activities aimed at changing 
the physical properties of the impact object. Just this group of technologies is the 
focus of evolutionary economists, who probably embraced too literally the common 
phrase Veblen that “the process of cumulative change that must consider the 
economic science is the sequence of changes in the methods of making cases that is 
methods of treatment of the material means of existence” (Winter, 2004). The 
second (Ta-technology) are related to the implementation of the interactions of 
economic agents, helping to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their 
communications and transactions. These include the legal (and increasingly 
institutional), managerial (organizational in general), financial, trade, transport, 
marketing, information (including cognitive) etc., the classification system of 
which is not yet developed.  
 
We emphasize that TF- and Ta-technology are used in the production and 
circulation, and consumption, so Ta-technology is not rigidly attached to the 
activities carried out within the framework of the transaction sector. In this context, 
technological progress should be understood as the co-evolution of 
transformational and transactional technologies, their clusters and generations at all 
levels of the structure of the global economic system. It is necessary to transfer to 
Ta-technology research emphasis, because until now, “the science base, which 
gives the social sciences social technologies is insufficient. Therefore, attempts to 
export the institutions from one country to another and to legitimize them in the last 
often unsuccessful as organ transplantation, because they do not have enough 
knowledge about the principles of social institutions. The knowledge of the 
principles of social technologies is also very superficial” (Eggertsson, 2011). 
 
As shown by Eggertsson (2008), new communication technologies, increasing the 
efficiency of transactions, generate innovative models of organization (Pisano, 
2006), which “opened the way” transformational innovation. Thus, according to 
Lux Research, enterprise social networks today are the powerful “catalyst” for the 
development of environmentally-neutral chemical technologies, ensuring effective 
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cooperation and coordination of laboratories, startups, universities, corporations 
and financial institutions (Corporate Social Networks, 2011). It becomes obvious 
expediency of special attention of researchers is not only to the change in the 
dominant technologies of transformation, much to their accordance with 
transaction-consistency in the development of technology.  
 
Indirectly Zworykin (1962) a prominent historian of technological progress paid 
attention to this problem, using the only possible for the time of Marxist 
terminology: “It is impossible to understand the development of technology, apart 
from the relations of production a particular socio-economic system. It is 
impossible to explain the contradictions in the development of technology in the 
conditions of modern capitalism, if not start from the capitalist relations of 
production”. He cited the example of Polzunov, (2005) nominated in the middle of 
the XVIII century the brilliant idea of replacing the water wheel heat engine, which 
(despite the Herculean efforts) did not receive the application in Russia, as the 
economic institutions of feudalism did not create effective incentives and motives 
for the introduction of technological innovations. In contrast, in the UK 
institutional environment contributed to innovations that allowed the steam engine 
of Watt (2004) induced deep industrial revolution. 
 
In this regard, it is difficult to support the point of view Perez (2011), accentuating 
exclusively “inertia and resistance to change social institutional framework” but 
leaving out of sight of the innovative functions of the institutes. The “improvement 
of production (transformation -Ed.) technologies opens new business opportunities, 
and this gives rise to complementary social (transaction -Ed.) technology. The 
reverse process when social technologies lead to industrial innovation is possible” 
(Eggertsson, 2011). Thus, in the case of nanotechnology which is positioned by 
many scientists as a new basic innovation (Mensch, 2004), a key role acquires 
complementary institutional and integrated marketing technologies. Currently, 
nanotechnology - a new generation of innovations problem with potentially huge, 
but uncertain potential, numerous and virtually unstudied risks, requiring huge 
investments without explicit guarantee of market success (Frolov and Stratulat, 
2010). Their widespread use should be accompanied by the priority development of 
the regulatory framework and proactive marketing, inattention which has been a 
key reason for the collapse of the commercial engineering technology of 
genetically modified organisms. 
 
The main methodological problem of technological determinism is the substitution 
of the real content of economic evolution, the progress of the social division of 
labor and cooperation, the system integration and the differentiation of types and 
forms of human activity, improving the ways, the methods and the tools for their 
implementation. “The methods of doing business” obscure and shift to the 
background activity itself, the implementation of which they contribute. At the 
same time, from the point of view of Metcalf (2007), “one important aspect of 
innovation is namely the addition of new activities within the framework of 
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individual consumer behavior” including the consumer of investment goods. 
Running people (individually or in organizations) of different status of life 
functions (institutions) (Inshakov and Frolov, 2010) objectively requires specific 
methods and the use of tools. Technologies are not significant in themselves, but as 
ways of implementing institutions. Because each economic agent is included in 
different parallel planned institutions as Lousbi (2007) rightly remarked 
“cumulative set of interrelated types of consumer activity can be represented as a 
result of the analysis as the identifiable style of life” and the corresponding to it the 
“common way of thinking” (Veblen 1984), forming a system of “shared beliefs” 
agents (Aoki, 2007). 
 
Methodology 
 
The enormous potential of information and communication technologies of wide 
application is associated just with the creation of an array of new institutions – 
highly qualified professions (Internet-related activities) (Internet matters, 2011) and 
sustainable forms of leisure activities. In fact, “The Internet has offered a new set of 
social situations, and people immediately rushed for the new masks” (Lewis, 2004), 
and “specific economic masks people is just an impersonation of economic 
(institutional -Ed.) relationships, as carriers of which these faces opposed to each 
other” (Marx 1951) and interact with each other. 
 
From the standpoint of evolutionary realism, the basis not only transaction, but the 
transformation technologies are those institutions, the implementation of which 
they serve. Radical technological innovation is determined by whether it creates a 
new activity or only facilitates the implementation of already existing institutions. 
The scope of application of new technologies related to how many agents carried 
the kinds provided by its activity, what the place and the role of these institutions in 
the economic system, are and thus “the demand for goods is thus based on the 
demand for the implementation of certain activities” (Metcalf 2007).  
 
This requires further development of the Schumpeterian concept by expanding the 
concept of innovators, they are not only entrepreneurs engaged in “new 
combinations”, but also consumers, because progress often “does not depend on 
technological innovation in the usual sense, but from a user innovation” (Metcalf, 
2007) associated with unplanned use of innovations. The institutionalization of 
technological development is expressed not only in the creation of new technical 
regulations and standards, industry standards and infrastructure, but, above all, the 
emergence and expansion of institutions provided innovative technologies relevant 
to their patterns, norms and behaviors (Frolov, 2011). 
 
Consequently, the change of the leading technological structures, “clusters” and 
“paradigms” of content presents the process of competitive economic institutions. 
Each technology of wide application corresponds to the “institution-related”, that is 
functionally separate and technologically interdependent activities, which agents 
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seek to defend and strengthen its strategic associate status. Macro and mega 
generations (Majewski, 1997) as a generational group of technology-related 
industry of institutions of national and global scale are the “conductors” of basic 
technologies and “institutional entrepreneurs”, they are stiff competition for scarce 
resources, including the entering cooperative relations and forming a complex 
alliance. 
 
Scientific search for high-tech is not an institutionally neutral process. New 
technologies are not created hermit scientists in ivory or ebony towers. The huge 
capital intensity of business research requires the active search for additional 
financial resources and cohesive lobbying their research programs, based on the 
support of the state and / or the large business. The field of high-tech science is the 
arena of the hard clash of interests, sophisticated competition “related groups” of 
influence and pressure, abounding PR-shares, intrigues, distortion and 
opportunism. It takes place intertwining and the merging of status interests of 
various “stakeholders” of the new technology: researchers, research foundations 
and industrial business, politicians, venture investors, rating agencies, expert 
organizations, marketing companies, media, etc.  
 
An example is the story of lobbying the idea of nanotechnology as a key factor of 
competitiveness of the United States (Loc, 2010; Joaquim and Plever, 2009). 
Governmental decisions are the result of the competition of sectoral and cross-
industry lobbies, thus, the introduction in Russia of tough measures to combat 
tobacco reflects not so much the state cares about the health of its citizens, as the 
defeat of lobbyists tobacco industry to compete with transnational pharmaceutical 
business (including Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, GlaxoSmithKline and others) and 
supported by major retail chains. 
 
Technological progress is inextricably linked with the social division of labor or 
institutogenesis - occurrence of the process, “rooting” and the spread of new 
institutions in the economy and society. The diffusion of new technologies does not 
happen by itself, in isolation from the society. To become a norm in the 
consumption and use, technological innovation must gain a strong social base. Each 
technology generates extensive use of complex “related institutions”, agents that 
use it in their vital activity, earning income and gaining. Any “basic innovation”, on 
the one hand creates a lot of jobs and generates new needs, on the other hand, 
destroys the existing professions devaluing older skills and knowledge, starts 
structural unemployment. Technological development in this sense is a complex 
and sometimes extremely painful social process. The success or the failure of new 
technologies is primarily due to the support of stakeholders in its social groups. 
Change of technological structures is always a tough process of institutional 
competition. 
 
Results 
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Let’s consider the example of nanotechnology as a generalized multi-stage logic 
institutionalization of the general-purpose technology (GPT) in the context of 
globalization and state monopoly capitalism, especially since according to Roco 
(2010) now they can reasonably be classified as GPT: 
 
1. Informal stochastics institutionalization inevitably accompanies the birth and the 
formation of a new technology in a series of “break-through” experiments carried 
out by the action (often informal) groups of researchers based on unsustainable 
resources and unstable channels to attract them, in terms of fuzzy goals and an 
implicit intellectual cooperation strategy. 
 
In the most ordinary day in March 1981 future Nobel laureates in physics G.K. 
Binnig and H. Rohrer after little more than two years after it was formulated the 
basic concept of a scanning tunneling microscope (STM) by their experiments have 
proved the presence of characteristic exponential dependence of tunneling current It 
from distance σz the tip –as a sample. This event has become a kind of “Big bang” 
for a new “nano-Universe”, using terminology shaped by Perez (2011). The 
developed device not only allowed to identify individual atoms and molecules, but 
also gave the opportunity to manipulate with them (this ability STM was 
discovered in 1989). However, in 1995, at the atomic level manipulation around the 
world only 5 small research teams engaged in it. 
 
2. The recognition, the first recognition and the beginning of lobbying. Attracting 
the attention of government officials to the potential of the new technologies 
requires favorable political conditions and the presence of a charismatic proselyte 
actively advocating GPT. With the support of influential politicians, the first 
“pressure groups” are created and developed by the preliminary forecasts and 
reports on the prospects of a new GPT, and gradually more active discussions start. 
 
In the summer of 1992 enthusiastic for environmental issues, Senator Al Gore 
organized in the Senate hearings on the development of new technologies for 
sustainable development, where a famous scientist and science fiction writer E. 
Drexler, supported the senator and later received from the press the title of “father 
of nanotechnology.” Shortly before this event (in 1991), he received his doctorate 
in molecular nanotechnology. His convictions and ardent speech (in which the 
speaker skillfully quoted Nobel Laureate R. Feynman in 1959) was devoted to the 
prospects to produce “molekulmachines”, capable of creating any materials and 
devices from single atoms, “brick by brick”, “bottom-up”. With the support of Al 
Gore has created a group of lobbyists idea of sustainable development, and soon 
after his appointment as a vice-president in charge of new technology, a report was 
published “Science at the service of the country” (1994), which proclaimed the 
strategic importance of nanotechnology for the development of electronic, chemical 
and pharmaceutical sectors of US industry. The fore industrial lobby on the front 
edge of nanotechnology propaganda came to Roco (2010) and replaced by Drexler 
(2008). The director of the National Science Foundation (NSF) H. Lane, and 
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especially an adviser to President Bill Clinton on economic issues T. Kalil 
promoted his nomination. It is through the latter M. Roco when he put together a 
working group, which by 1999 had prepared a draft of the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), where nanotechnology was treated as 
strategically important, qualitatively new ways of miniaturization, close to the 
nanometer measurement range. 
 
3. State support, the formal institutionalization and expansion. At this stage, the 
new GPT acquires national development strategies and programs, formed the 
institutional framework and infrastructure, is formed there is a budgetary and 
legislative consolidation of the relevant strategic priorities, as reflected in the policy 
research grant funds and lead to an increase in the number of researchers. 
Supporting informal institutions gradually are formalize and get innovative 
technologies and “overgrown” complex institutional arrangements. Many formal 
and informal optimistic forecasts. Appear the first examples of fraud, are identified 
which are inherent of new GPT risks and the debates on its security begin. The 
international competition in the high-tech market, taking the character of “race” 
activates. 
 
In March 1999, was approved by the NNI budget ($300 million in 2000), and its 
implementation, which began when Clinton officially announced January 21, 2000. 
A new group of lobbyists rallied around the Nobel Prize winner in Chemistry R. 
Smalley, the discoverer of fullerenes who during his speeches in the House of 
representatives of the congress (1999-2002) contributed to the expansion of 
nanotechnology and the treatment capacity of budgetary financing of American 
research in the fields of chemistry and materials science. Serious illness of Smalley 
in 2003 once again brought to the center of the lobbying Roco, who spoke with a 
new idea of NBIC-convergence, even the key term “nanotechnology”. Increasingly 
“NNI was reduced to a very uncertain and the general program of a variety of 
materials research” (Plever, 2009) with a parallel increase in its budget (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Dynamics of budget NNI (2000-2012), $ million 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
~300 464 697 760 989 1200 1351 1425 1554 1695 1912 1850 2130 
Source: http://www.nano.gov/about-nni/what/funding. 
 
NBIC-convergence is, first and foremost, an ambitious mega-project cross-sectoral 
integration of large, high-tech, high-tech business, and not an “objective” process 
of integration and synergy of natural nanoscience. Painted by Roco (2003) and co-
authors “boom NBIC” was aimed at lobbying to the further increase budget 
expenditures for a wide range of research in the sphere of high technologies and 
their effective “development”. The project NBIC-convergence had alternatives: 
GNR (Genetics, Nanotechnology, Robotics), GRIN (Genetic, Robotic, Information, 
Nanotechnology), GRAIN (Genetics, Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, 
Nanotechnology), BANG (Bits, Atoms, Neurons, Genes), and others. The final 
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choice was obviously dictated by the widest area of research and development, in 
which the implementation of almost any possible capital-intensive research projects 
was possible. 
 
Since 2000 national initiatives, strategies and nanotechnology development 
program after the United States took more than 60 countries, during the past 11 
years, governments have invested in nanotechnology research and development 
more than $ 67.5 billion and a global “nanorace”, economic and ideological 
confrontation of developed and fast-growing countries of the world for excellence 
in the field of nanotechnology began. This is a converted form of “arms race” in 
peace time (recall that in the history of mankind dreadnought race was at the 
beginning of the XX century and the nuclear missile of the USSR and the United 
States in the race was during the “Cold War”). 
 
According to the calculations Cientifica Ltd., the index of significance of 
nanotechnologies (Nanotech Impact Factor) has significant country variations. 
Thus, the availability of the highly developed infrastructure in the UK negatively 
offset by the low level of investment, while Russia has not only ranked third in the 
world in terms of funding of nanotechnology (yielding in 2010 only to China and 
the US), but gives them the monopoly status of the national mega-project in the 
field of innovation. At the same time, the index of capacity for the development and 
exploitation of emerging technologies (Emerging Technology Exploitation Factor), 
which reflects the capacity of countries in the aspect of transfer and diffusion of 
innovation, provides a different balance of power (Table 2). Despite the ambitious 
goals, and large-scale funding, Russia in the medium term is likely will remain a 
player of the “second league” of global nano industrialization because of the sheer 
catching-up in terms of development of converged technologies, inefficient 
institutional mechanisms of the national innovation system and preserving a 
problem of “brain drain”. “Accelerated development” of the national 
nanotechnology industry requires the science demands optimization of strategic 
control. 
 
Table 2. Indexes of the importance and potential application nanotechnology 
(2011) 
Country NanotechImpactFactor Rating EmTechExploitationFactor Rating 
USA 100 1 5,00 1 
China 89 2 4,30 7 
Russia 83 3 3,57 10 
Germany 30 4 4,93 2 
Japan 29 5 4,88 4 
EU 27 6 4,23 8 
SouthKorea 25 7 4,60 5 
Taiwan 9 8 4,90 3 
UK 6 9 4,55 6 
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India 5 10 3,95 9 
Source: compiled by the author based on (Global Fundings, 2011). 
 
From the standpoint of the contract theory of money (Tambovtsev, 2009) the 
currency of the leading countries can be regarded as being in the process of 
execution of the contract for the supply of advanced technology of wide application 
(general purpose technology) (Dementiev, 2009). In our view, the reserve 
currencies are the futures contracts for the development of the technology of global 
application (global purpose technology), one of which now nanotechnology are 
along with the synthetic biotechnology and the computer technology of the “fifth 
generation” (from the mobile 4G and the semantic web to quantum computer and 
virtual reality). All “nanotechnology race participants closely watch the actions of 
each other” (Dementiev, 2009), which undermines the illusion of institutional 
neutrality of the investment processes in the field of nanotechnology. Governments 
of the competitor countries, increasing the budgets of nanotechnology programs 
largely decide the status and ideological objectives, forming a mutual expectation 
about the future configuration of forces in the global economy. 
 
4. The Connection at the large private (venture) capital, the “techno-blizzard” and 
the “herd effect”. Under the influence of government policy initiatives, the 
increasing of the budget funding and venture capital investors optimistic forecasts 
the investors significantly increase the share of investments in the new GPT in their 
“portfolios.” Despite the efforts of skeptics, the media begins “techno-hype” the 
one-sided flow of positive pseudo expert information about the new technology and 
its “rainbow” prospects. Revaluation of GPT is accompanied by lack of risk-based 
and lack of objective analysis that leads to euphoria and boom on the stock 
exchanges, the massive fraud, the formation of “bubble” in the stock market the 
crisis and the correction of the market potential assessment, the optimization and 
the rationalization of investment flows. 
 
The steady growth of private investment in nanotechnology during 2000s.Was 
caused solely by strategic programs, and huge amounts of research funding in this 
area by the governments of the leading countries. In 2004 (Global Funding, 2011), 
or according to some other sources, in 2007 (Global Funding, 2008) the private 
capital on a global scale for the first time invested in this sector more than the 
states.  
 
On the one hand, this milestone event confirms the trend of intensive growth of 
commercialization of pre-production stages of the development of the 
nanotechnology industry (Inshakov, 2011). On the other hand, it reflects the 
cumulative effect of the emergence of “herd behavior” of investment institutions 
(venture capital funds, etc). It would be naive to believe that the actions of these 
structures are rational, even though the total volume of the investments are 
measured in billions of dollars. At the end of the 1990s investment institutes and 
overestimated the scope of IT and e-commerce (on the background of hysteria of 
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numerous experts, portending the imminent advent of the “new economy”), causing 
a boom and the collapse of “dotcom”. It is likely that this situation will repeat with 
nanotechnologies. So far, the commercial prospects of nanotechnology, are 
“fueled” extremely the exaggerated prognosis, the inventors of them are difficult to 
recognize the independent experts. Specialists in this field are still insufficient, and 
the agents of investment institutions obviously do not possess the necessary 
expertise to evaluate the projects and the competences, this deficit compensated by 
trend-following strategy, which leads to herd behavior. 
 
As Perez (2011) shows unrealistic economic expectations in respect of new 
technologies often lead to financial bubbles and the reverse reaction, adversely 
affecting their further progress. It looks symptomatic of the fact that in 2011 the 
new commodity exchange began to work, Integrated Nano-Science and Commodity 
Exchange (INSCX), providing a wide range of nano-commerce, from basic 
nanomaterials and ending with the “advanced” (Nanopolymers, photonics, and so 
on). Apparently, the day of the introduction of a new stock index NASDAQ 
Nanotechnology Index after the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index (for the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries companies) is coming. 
 
Confidence in the bright future nanotechnology industry is primarily based on size 
and market projections, the range of the variation of which is impressive (Table 3). 
 
Table 3.  The forward field of the world market of nano-production ($ bn.) 
Developerandyear 
forecast 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2020 
LuxResearch (2006, 
2008) 
- - - - 2600 3100 - 
BCC (2008, 2010) - 27 - - - 26.7 - 
Cientifica (2008) - - 263 - - 1500 - 
RNCOS (2006) 1000 - - - - - - 
Wintergreen (2004) - - - - - 750 - 
MRI (2002) 148 - - - - - - 
EvolutionCapital 
(2001) 
700 - - - - - - 
NSF (1999, 2001, 
2010) 
- - - - - 1000 3000 
Source: compiled by the author based on (Palmberg, Dernis and Miguet 2009; Roco, 2010, 
Nanotechnology Research Review, OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 
2010). 
 
While all forecasts adjusted the global economic crisis, it is important not so much 
to their accuracy, as the estimates order. Note that all forecasting organizations use 
different definitions of nanotechnology and the nanoproducts, as well as poorly 
comparable calculation methods. In this sense, the comparison of the various 
projections is not possible, that is often overlooked by researchers. Thus, the most 
optimistic forecasts appeal to the final price of products with nanocomponents, 
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although it is more correct would be to consider just the price of nanocomponents 
and the price difference with the “Not nanotechnological” analogue item which 
shows the amount of value added nanotechnology. In addition, in many forecasts 
(Lux Research) are manifested the error of double counting when consistently 
accounted for nanotech prices of raw materials, semi-finished and finished 
products. Obviously inflated estimates of future production volumes of nano 
industry global market still being in its infancy, derived from “budget oriented” as 
reports M. Roco - “Nano-1” (1999) and “Nano-2” (2010). It was the first of them 
the fascinating figure of $ 1 trillion by 2015 was first performed, which was the 
starting point for almost all future projections (with the sole exception of 
Wintergreen). Barsukova (2010) truly says: “Nanotechnology has long turned into 
a synonym of PR technologies”.  
 
Even the global assessment of the current state of the nano market is absurdly 
widely varied from modest $ 12 billion (The Big Downturn in 2010, III) to 
whopping $ 254 billion (Roco, 2010). This is not surprising. In the absence of clear 
rules for registration and marking nobody really knows the actual number of 
products containing nanoparticles and manufactured using nanotechnology. 
However, estimates of Lux Research, appealing to the maximum values of the scale 
became the most cited. This proves the primacy of institutional factors 
nanotechnology “boom”, enhanced by the action sociological mechanisms. But the 
methodology applied Lux Research, is very far from the perfect. It is based on the 
idea of nanotechnology “adding value chain» (value chain), which has exceptional 
potential of “inflating” of the final estimates. For example, if the installer sets in the 
home kitchen work surface, which comprises antibacterial silver nanoparticles 
whether the contribution of nanotechnology should be understood as the amount of 
silver nanoparticles, throughout the working surface or the whole house? It sounds 
absurd, but Lux Research would summarize all three options (Roco, 2010). 
 
Pursuing their status interests, analytical and marketing companies serve the 
economic interests of big business in the field of nanotechnology, de facto speaking 
as its agents and losing the status of independent experts, while ignoring the 
function of providing objective assessments of market trends. Similarly, when 
science becomes an object of big business interests inevitably there is a 
transformation of affiliated scientists in its people. Such an institutional merging is 
seen in the most areas of modern high-tech businesses, for example, in the 
pharmaceutical industry (Shell, 2004). There is the mass demonstration replication 
of strategies in the scientific community related to purposeful imitation belonging 
to Nanotechnology by adding the names of the projects and works grant-capacious 
prefix “nano” in order to update them in order to gain the funding (Berube, 2006). 
An example is the Large Hadron Collider, during which the news that “scientists 
are faced with an unexpected effect” or “discovered a fundamentally new 
phenomenon” appear punctually. Thus, in September 2010, an international 
collaboration of CMS sent to the Journal of High Energy Physics the publication 
that describes the unusual effect in clashes “high multiplicity”. However, according 
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to experts, this phenomenon in general is hardly new, it is adequately interpreted 
based on known physical laws and theories, rather representing a PR-action to 
maintain interest in the “Geneva monster” (Oganesyan, 2010). Investors 
“customize” researchers and explorers mislead the investors by imaginary results. 
If for “pure” science “a negative result is the same result,” then the modern capital-
scope of R & D is there almost no margin for error: the investors and the grantors 
do not give it practically. 
 
5. Social institutionalization: public recognition or rejection or rooting and survival. 
At this stage, the key factors of success of the new technology become are its image 
and reputation. Public recognition enables the mass production of high-tech 
consumer goods (due to the formation of new norms and standards of 
consumption), and the social rooting (embeddedness) GPT characterizes the 
processes of routinization and normalization of the related techniques and the 
ability for life images, as result this technology becomes the basis of various 
institutions. On this basis, it may arise and start to expand nano industry, 
institutionally specified, organized on a large scale, mass production of 
standardized goods and services with nano things almost all spheres of human life 
(Inshakov, 2010b). 
 
On the contrary, the rejection of the new GPT (despite the extensive research and 
the investment process) becomes a consequence of the neglect for the marketing 
and the institutional policies on pre-production stages and is due primarily to 
concern society risks of innovative products for the consumer health and 
environmental hazards in their production. Rejected GPT, however, has the 
prospect of convergence with other, socially neutral technologies. 
 
For the role of the mental (“social” in his terminology) models in the mass social 
adaptation of new technologies Eggertsson (2011) attracts his attention. In the case 
of biogenetics in Iceland, he shows that “to promote their own ideas about the 
proper social model can be achieved by the way of an honest exchange of ideas or 
because the subjects often mislead others through the deliberate falsification of the 
information with a view to profit”. So far it is not strange that not a single 
developer of the projections of the future nanotechnology industry “consider in his 
development scenarios approval of the problem of the nanotechnology by the 
society, although a lesson should be learning from the history of previously arisen 
revolutionary technologies such as nuclear power and genetically modified 
organisms” (Hulman, 2009). Such scenarios are not even articulated to avoid self-
fulfilling predictions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Probably not by chance in 2008 Drexler with his explained vaguely reasons 
officially renounced the concept of “gray goo” asserting the possibility of self-
replicating nanomachines and the global nanotechnology catastrophe. Perhaps the 
  D.P. Frolov, A.O. Inshakova, M.L. Davydova 
 
603 
father of nanotechnology heeded the appeals of Roco, who since 2003 in his 
interviews and articles constantly called him to refute his concept, harming the 
image of the nanotechnology industry. However, “now nanotech lobby is clearly in 
a state of fear. Its representatives fear that their PR-activity may result in an even 
more spectacular failure, than the one that occurred with the genetic engineering” 
(Allhoff, 2009). Note that, despite their obviously negative image, the cumulative 
profits of transnational corporations engaged in the development, production and 
marketing of GMOs more than $ 3-5 billion., And by 2020 can reach $ 50-100 
billion. Rejected by the society biogenetics technology to successfully embed to the 
format of new GPT (in line with the NBIC-convergence) as a nanobiotechnology 
 
Institutional nano industry development logic expresses the non-equilibrium 
dynamics of the chaotic motion to the order with inevitable mi suboptimal 
equilibria (“traps”), allowing to understand that in the evolution of technology, as 
well as “in nature there are no jumps precisely because it is composed entirely of 
leaps” (Engels, 1953). System interconnection of the technological and socio-
economic systems determine the endogenous nature of the institutions (Inshakov, 
2007) as a complex factor of the progress of the new technologies of wide 
application, including nanotechnology. 
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